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Abstract 
Extending Ireland’s (1994) model, this paper analyzes an international economy where 
cash or credit can be used for payment. Foreign trade credit is more costly than its 
domestic analog. A depreciation of the real exchange rate is associated with an external 
surplus and a reduced share of imports purchased with credit. Economic growth slows 
when foreign trade credit becomes the predominant means of payment for international 
transactions. A country with high inﬂation exports its Tobin eﬀect and thus temporarily 
increases world growth. 
1. Introduction 
Extending Ireland’s (1994) elegant model, this paper explores how exchange 
rates and trade credits aﬀect international economic growth. Building on the 
work of Prescott (1987) and Schreft (1992), Ireland explores the margin between 
cash and credit goods. In any market, consumers may pay cash or buy on credit. 
Each good is characterized by how closely integrated its market is into the local 
ﬁnancial system, and goods are ordered by their ﬁxed credit costs. Since the 
opportunity cost of buying with cash is forgone interest, consumers typically use 
credit in markets where it is inexpensive. 
An immediate question is: what is a credit good? Lucas and Stokey (1987) 
argue that leisure, a non-market good, is a typical example. This interpretation 
is strictly correct but slightly unsatisfactory for international economists, since 
the crux of our sub-discipline hangs upon the gains from trade (of presumably 
marketed goods). I propose the following explanation. The cash-in-advance 
constraint is really a description of an explicit lag in the payments mechanism, as 
Kohn (1981) has emphasized. These delays are characteristic of international 
commerce, and most trade is accomplished through letters of credit between 
major commercial banks and concomitant bank transfers.� Thus international 
credit goods are those for which the payment lags are longer than the typical 
holding period for foreign exchange. 
This way of thinking about credit goods has a felicitous byproduct for an 
international economist. An unpleasant implication of simple cash-in-advance 
models in international economics is that the exogenous payments mechanism 
typically implies unit velocities for both domestic and foreign currency.� In the 
analysis below, these velocities are determined endogenously, and domestic 
currency has a higher velocity than foreign exchange during the early stages of 
growth. 
Of course, exchange rates are endogenous asset prices in a full description of 
the world economy. Thus it is not appropriate to think that a real depreciation 
‘causes’ export-led growth or that higher rates of money creation ‘lead to’ 
a weaker nominal exchange rate. Instead, it is better to emphasize that exchange 
rates are inextricably linked with monetary policies, inﬂation rates, and nominal 
interest rates in equilibrium. In a classic paper, Helpman (1981) shows that 
exchange rates, interest rates, and the supplies of high-powered money are not 
independent. Indeed, in the economies described below, if central banks target 
nominal interest rates, then there is a continuum of equilibria parameterized by 
the initial nominal exchange rate.� Since nominal interest rates determine 
inﬂation proﬁles, each such exchange rate corresponds to a diﬀerent money 
supply process in every country. These policies then determine trade balances, 
investment, and thus world growth. 
Money is not neutral because Ireland’s model has an explicit Tobin (1965) 
eﬀect. The model has a very simple supply side, and higher inﬂation corresponds 
to higher nominal rates. These in turn raise the shadow value of holding money, 
and a wider range of goods is bought on credit. But ﬁnancial intermediation uses 
real resources and thus aﬀects growth. For most plausible speciﬁcations of the 
costs of credit, these growth eﬀects are transitory, but Ireland’s model estab­
lishes a transparent link between inﬂation and growth. It ﬂeshes out Tobin’s 
� That some of these oﬀ-balance-sheet activities provide tax advantages and circumvent reserve 
requirements is not immaterial. 
� The international reserves of the U.S. monetary authority in 1994 were about $74 billion and 
total imports were near $818 billion, implying a velocity near 11. In the same year, the stock of 
domestic currency was $355 billion and GDP was $6931 billion, entailing a velocity of about 18. 
� The analysis in Dupour (1997) suggests that this result may be a general property of cash-in­
advance models in international economics. 
intuition: higher inﬂation spurs capital accumulation, even as it lowers society’s 
welfare. In an international economy, higher foreign inﬂation raises world 
growth, even as it lowers welfare in every country. 
Much of the analysis hinges upon the costs of credit. I adopt a simple 
speciﬁcation, and credit for a foreigner is more expensive than it is for a 
local. Countries will typically buy a range of domestic goods on credit well 
before they begin to use foreign ﬁnancial intermediaries. Indeed, a country 
usually experiences three stages of growth. First, its domestic ﬁnancial 
system develops, as local residents buy a wider range of domestic goods on 
credit. Second, it experiences a decrease in growth as it becomes integrated into 
the world ﬁnancial system and imports the services of foreign ﬁnancial inter­
mediaries. Third, it grows at a rate reﬂecting a combination of society’s discount 
factor and the marginal eﬃciency of investment. In the long run, the share of 
resources used in domestic and foreign ﬁnancial intermediation may become 
negligible. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section will present the 
model. Section 3 will discuss properties of the equilibrium, and Section 4 will 
present simulations of the model for a world consisting of two large countries 
whose underlying growth rate is near that of the United States in recent decades. 
Section 5 draws some brief conclusions and suggests directions for future 
research. 
2. The model 
The model is an extension of Ireland’s (1994), and thus its exposition will be 
cursory, except when the details of the international economy bear elucidation. 
There is a continuum of domestic goods and another continuum of foreign 
goods. Each good is distinguished by its location, and goods diﬀer by how much 
it costs to purchase them on credit. Thus a good’s location is its distance, in 
terms of the ease of intermediation, from a country’s ﬁnancial center, and credit 
costs increase with distance. There are two countries, and the costs of obtaining 
domestic and foreign credit are diﬀerent. The cost of credit in any market, at 
home or abroad, is a recurring ﬁxed cost that an agent pays to a local ﬁnancial 
intermediary. Once the cost is paid, an agent can purchase as much as he wishes 
of that good on credit in that period. 
Agents can opt to buy domestic goods with cash or imports with foreign 
exchange. Of course, the opportunity cost of buying a good with cash is the 
interest forgone. Since the cost of credit increases away from the ﬁnancial center, 
there may be a fringe of domestic cash goods. Likewise, a country will accumu­
late foreign exchange if the costs of foreign credit are high. 
Let X be the set of measurable functions whose typical element is 
x : �H, F�
� �[0, 1]PR , and write X"�� X . Then º : XPR is the social 
� � � � �
� � � 
�� ��
�� ��
� �
�� �� 
welfare function for the domestic economy; its rule is 
º(c)" � � �� ��
� 
[u(c (i))#u(c (i))]di 
where c (i) represents the consumption of the ith home good at time t, c (i) is  
analogous, and c"((c (i)) , (c (i)) )� is the entire consumption proﬁle 
�� ������� �� ������� � �
for the domestic economy. The assumption that preferences are separable in 
domestic and foreign goods is no stronger than the analogous postulate for 
goods in diﬀerent locations. 
The foreign consumption proﬁle is c*"((c* (i)) , (c* (i)) )
�
�
�
,� and the 
�� ������� �� �������
analogous social welfare function is º*(c*). The foreign and domestic economies 
discount future felicity at the same rate; this assumption is unavoidable since 
country-speciﬁc discount factors give rise to degenerate long-run distributions 
of wealth.� Still, countries’ felicity functions may diﬀer, and the gains from trade 
can be very large if these functions satisfy the usual Inada conditions, since an 
economy cannot produce its trading partner’s goods. 
Producers of domestic goods are uniformly distributed along the unit interval, 
and foreign ﬁrms are likewise distributed along a diﬀerent unit interval. Produc­
tion in the domestic economy is given by 
y
�
(i)"Ak
�
(i) 
where y (i) the output of the ith good and k (i) is capital per worker in that sector, 
both at time t. Assume that A�'1 so that growth is possible.� Production in 
the foreign economy is described by y* 
� 
(i)"Ak* 
� 
(i). Thus the marginal product of 
capital is identical in all sectors in both countries, and the physical location of 
the capital stock is indeterminate. These functions are perhaps unduly simple, 
but our focus is on the relationship between monetary policy, ﬁnancial inter­
mediation, and economic growth, and it is appropriate to keep production as 
simple as possible. Since goods are produced by identical technologies, all 
domestic goods sell for p and all foreign goods sell for p in a competitive 
equilibrium. Finally, the notation k"��k (i) di and k*"��k* K (i) di will be con­� � � � � �
venient below. 
Now I can give a formal description of the technology for ﬁnancial intermedi­
ation. The cost of domestic credit, in units of the i-th domestic good, is described 
by a strictly increasing and diﬀerentiable function �
�
(i), with �
�
(0)"0. The cost 
of foreign trade credit, denominated in units of a foreign good, is described by an 
� The convention is that the subscript H or F refers to a location and an asterisk refers to the 
foreign household. 
� See Becker (1980) for an elegant discussion. 
� See Jones and Manuelli (1997). 
��
�� �� �
�
, 
��
��
� 
�� ��
� 
�� 
�� � 
� � 
�� �� �� ��
� 
�� �� �� ��
� 
analogous �
�
(i). I impose that �
�
(0)'0 since it is more diﬃcult for a foreign 
intermediary to verify the ﬁnancial status of a domestic agent, even in the foreign 
ﬁnancial center. Thus the full cost of purchasing c (i) units of a domestic credit 
good is p (c (i)#� (i)) and that of purchasing a foreign good using trade credit 
is p (c (i)#� (i)). The foreign country faces analogous costs �*( ) ) and �*( ) ),
�� �� � � �
where the former is the cost to foreigners of obtaining credit in our home market 
and the latter is their cost of credit in their own country. 
Each economy faces two cash-in-advance constraints, one for home goods 
and another for foreign goods. The sequence of events is as follows. In period 0, 
a household splits its initial assets between domestic currency, foreign currency, 
domestic bonds, and foreign bonds. At this time the nominal exchange rate is e
the gross interest rate on bonds denominated in domestic currency is R , and 
that on foreign bonds is R . During period 1, each household goes shopping, 
constrained by its available cash balances in both denominations. Also, it uses 
income from production, investment income, and its moneys held in excess of 
shopping needs to buy a portfolio for period 2. During period 1, a household 
buys foreign exchange at the nominal rate of e per unit of domestic currency, 
and it buys bonds at the discount factors R and R . Thus the opportunity 
cost of money of either denomination is the forgone interest on the relevant 
period 0 bond. This process then repeats itself. 
The domestic household faces the constraint: 
H *M #B /R #e (M #B /R ), (1)
� �� �� �� � �� �� ��
where H are initial lump-sump transfers of high-powered money from the 
domestic government, M is money balances chosen at time 0 for shopping at 
time 1, B are domestic bonds maturing at time 1, e is the price of foreign 
exchange, and the other variables are analogous. For t"1, 2,2, the domestic 
household faces the constraints: 
(M #B #H )/p #e (M #B )/p #Ak
�� �� � �� � �� �� �� � 
5k #�
� 
c (i) di#�
� 
� (i)� (i) di#M /p
� � �� �� � �� � �� 
#B /R #(e
�
p /p c (i) di#�
� 
� (i)� (i)di��� � ��p�� �� �� �� �� �)��
�
� 
� 
#(e /p )(M #B /R ), (2)
� �� �� � �� � ��
M /p 5�
� 
[1!� (i)]c (i)di, (3) 
M /p 5�
� 
[1!� (i)]c (i)di (4) 
��
��
� � 
�� �� �� ��
� 
�� �� �� ��
� 
�� ��
� � 
�
, 
� � 
� 
. 
� 
��� 
��� 
where � (i) takes the value of unity if domestic good i is purchased with credit at 
time t and is zero otherwise. The indicator function � (i) is analogous. Notice 
that the household is constrained by the costs of domestic and foreign credit. 
Also, investment is the quintessential credit good since it requires no cash in 
advance and its ﬁxed credit cost is zero. Further, the domestic economy faces 
k 50, M 50 and M 50.
� � �� ��
Here are the foreign country’s constraints: 
H*5(M* #B /R )/e #(M #B /R )  (1*)
� �� �� �� � �� �� ��
and for t"1, 2,2, 
(M* #B* #H*)/e
�
p #(M* #B* )/p #Ak* 
�� �� � �� �� �� �� � 
5k* #(p /e c* (i) di#�
� 
�* (i)�*(i)di��p� � �� �� �� �� �)��
�
� 
�
 
#(M* #B* /R )/e #�
� 
c* (i)di#�
� 
�* (i)�*(i) di

�
p
�� � �� � �� �� �� �� �
#M* /p #B* /p R (2*)
�� � �� �� � �� ��
, 
M* /p 5�
� 
[1!�* (i)]c* (i) di,  (3*) 
M* /p 5�
� 
[1!�* (i)]c* (i)di,  (4*) 
where all the variables and the indicator functions �* (i) and �* (i) are analogous. 
Likewise, k* 50, M* 50, and M* (i)50 must also hold. 
� � �� ��
Material balances are given by: 
k #�
� 
[c (i)#c* (i)]di#�
� 
[� (i)� (i)#�* (i)�*(i)]di4Ak
� � �� �� �� � �� �
k* #�
� 
[c (i)#c* (i)]di#�
� 
[� (i)� (i)#�* (i)�*(i)]di)Ak* 
� � �� �� �� � �� �
The equilibrium conditions in the currency markets are: 
M #M* 4 � H
�� � �� � � 
M #M* 4 � � H* 
� 
.
�� � �� �
� �
� � � 
�� �� 
�� ��
�
��
�� 
Equilibrium in the two bond markets is described by 
B #B* "0,
�� � �� � 
B #B* "0.
�� � �� � 
Let � "� "1, � "�� (1/R ), and � "�� (1/R ) be the nom­
�� �� �� ��� ���� �� ��� ����
inal discount factors for home and foreign bonds respectively. Then the asset 
markets also satisfy 
lim � B "lim � B "lim � B* "lim � B* "0.
� � �� �� � � �� �� � � �� �� � � �� �� 
An equilibrium is a list of consumption plans (c, c*), money holdings 
�(M ), (M* 
��
, M* )�� , bond holdings �(B ), (B* 
��
, B* )�� , investment 
��
, M
�� �� � � ��
, B
�� �� � �
plans �k �� , corresponding good prices �(p )�� , assets prices 
� �
, k* 
� � � � ��
, p
�� � �
�(R )�� , such that each economy maximizes its own welfare, taking 
��
, R
��
, e
� � �
prices, the initial distribution of real wealth (k , k*), and lump-sum transfers of 
high powered money �(H
�
, H*)�� as given. Of course, consumption, invest­
ment, and portfolio choices must satisfy material balances and the asset market 
conditions as well. 
3. Some properties of equilibrium 
Let �
�
, � , and � be the shadow values of Eqs. (2)—(4) respectively, and deﬁne 
�
�
,e
�
p /p , the real exchange rate at time t. The domestic country’s maximiza­
tion problem entails that u�(c
��
(i))"�
� 
if domestic good i is purchased with credit 
and u�(c (i))"�#� if it is purchased with home currency. Also,
�� � �� 
u�(c
��
(i))"�
�
�
� 
if foreign good i is purchased with foreign credit and 
u�(c (i))"� �#� if it is purchased with foreign exchange. Let the shadow 
�� � � ��
values of Eqs. (2*)—(4*) have the obvious notation. The analogous conditions 
for the foreign country in its own market are u*�(c* (i))"�* and 
u*�(c* (i))"�*#�* Likewise, u*�(c* (i))"�*/� and u*�(c* (i�))�"�*/�� #�* 
�� � ��
. 
�� � � �� � � ��
obtain for foreign imports of credit and cash goods, respectively. 
Let cJ 
�� 
"(u�)��(�
�
) be the amount of a credit good purchased, and let 
cL "(u�)��(�#� ) be that of domestic cash good purchased. Assume that the 
�� � ��
felicity functions are increasing concave functions that satisfy the usual Inada 
conditions. Then cJ 
��
5cL 
�� 
'0, with strict inequality when the cash in advance 
constraint binds. Thus the decision to purchase home goods on credit is 
summarized by: 
(i)"�
1 if  u(cJ )!� (cJ #� (i))5u(cL )!(�#� )cL
�� � �� � �� � �� ��
, 
0 otherwise. 
The shadow value of the cash-in-advance constraint satisﬁes � '0 when the 
domestic interest rate is strictly positive. Hence an important aspect of this rule 
�
��
� � 
. 
� � �
is that no credit good would be purchased if the domestic nominal interest rate 
were zero. Also, when this rate is high, a wider selection of domestic credit goods 
is bought. 
Let cJ "(u�)��(� � ) and cL "(u�)��(� �#� ). A depreciation of the real 
�� � � �� � � ��
exchange rate lowers the quantities of both credit and cash goods imported. 
Thus a real depreciation has the usual aﬀect on the trade balance by decreasing 
the volume of all imports. The rule for determining imports bought with credit 
and foreign exchange is 
(i)"�
1 if  u(cJ )!� � (cJ #� (i))5u(cL )!(� �#� )cL
�� � � �� � �� � � �� ��
, 
0 otherwise. 
Recall that the costs of foreign ﬁnancial intermediation are strictly greater than 
zero. Thus during the early stages of economic growth, no imports are bought 
on credit if � � � (0)'� L and the ﬁxed costs of foreign ﬁnancial intermedi­
� � � ��
c
��
ation exceed the interest forgone on foreign exchange holdings. As the domestic 
economy grows, a range of imports is eventually bought on credit if the foreign 
interest rate is strictly positive. 
Let cJ * "(u*�)��(�*) and cL * "(u*�)��(�*#�* ). Again, the properties of the 
�� � �� � ��
felicity functions imply that cJ * 5cL * '0. Let cJ * "(u*�)��(�*/� ) and
�� �� �� � �
cL * "(u*�)��(�*/�#�* ). Now a real depreciation increases the quantities of 
�� � � ��
both credit and cash goods exported to foreigners. Since the felicity functions are 
fairly general, domestic and foreign goods may not be perfect substitutes, and 
the absolute version of purchasing power parity typically will not hold. Still, the 
rules �* (i) and �* (i) are simple, but the latter now involves the term �*/� . The 
�� �� � �
real exchange rate has a clear function in this model. It plays a role that is 
exactly analogous to the shadow value of Eq. (2) or Eq. (2*) as it pertains to 
international transactions. Hence a depreciation of the real exchange rate aﬀects 
cross-border trade exactly as does a rise in � and an oﬀsetting reduction in �* 
This fact has important implications for the dynamic eﬀects of exchange rates. 
The variational aspects of the equilibrium for the home country are: 
�"�A� , (5) 
� "�(� #� )/p ,
� � �� ��
� /p "�(� #� )/p , (6)
� �� � � �� � �� �
� e "�(� e /p #� /p ),
� � � � �� �� ��
�
�
e /p "�(� e /p #� /p ), (7)
� �� � � � � �� � �� � �� �
� /R "�� /p , � /R "�� /p , (8)
� �� � �� � ��
p
�� � � �� �
� e /R "�� e /p (9)
� � �� � � ��
,
 
� /R "�� e /p

�
e
� ��
p
�� � � � � �� � 
� 
where � is the shadow value of Eq. (1). For the sake of brevity, the rules that 
follow from the solution to the foreign country’s maximization are omitted. 
They involve terms like 1/e , 1/e and �* /p but are otherwise exactly 
�
p
� �� �� ��
, 
analogous. 
The transversality conditions are: 
lim � �� k "lim � ��*k* "0,
� � � � � � � � � � 
lim � �� (M /p )"lim � ��*(M* /e
�
p )"0,
� � � �� � �� � � � �� � ��
lim � �� (e M /p )"lim � ��*(M* /p )"0,
� � � � �� � �� � � � �� � ��
lim � �� (B /R )"lim � ��*(B* /R )"0,
� � � �� � ��
p
�� � � � �� � ��
e
�
p
��

lim ��� (e B /R )"lim � ��*(B* /R )"0.

� � � � �� � ��
p
�� � � � �� � ��
p
��
The conditions pertaining to the capital stocks will prove especially useful in 
simulating the behavior of this economy. 
An immediate implication of Eqs. (8) and (9) is that uncovered interest parity 
holds: e /e"R /R . Also, Eqs. (5) and (8), and their foreign analogs imply 
� � � �� ��
that the two Fisher relations have the simple forms: 
R
A" �� 
P /P
�� � �� 
and 
R
A" �� . 
P /P
�� � �� 
Since the two countries share a common technology, the real interest rates are 
identical. Hence the real exchange rate is constant, and �"e P /P ,� for
� � �� �� �
all t. In a regime of ﬁxed exchange rates, the two countries’ nominal interest rates 
and inﬂation rates are tied together. Otherwise, the rate of depreciation of the 
nominal exchange rate reﬂects both the interest and inﬂation diﬀerentials. 
Conditions (6) and (8) imply that R �"�#� , and Eqs. (7) and (9) 
�� � � � ��
imply that R �"�#� /�
�
. The analogs for the foreign country are
�� � � � ��
R �*"�*#� �* and R �*"�*#�* . These formulae allow a simple 
�� � � � � �� �� � � � ��
characterization of the decision to purchase credit goods. The home country 
uses domestic credit for goods i3[0, j
��
] and trade credit for imports i3[0, j
��
]. 
Otherwise the domestic economy uses home money to buy i3( j
��
, 1] and 
foreign exchange to import i3( j
��
, 1]. 
These two indices are functions respectively of (�
�
, R ) and (� �
�
, R ).
�� � � �� �
To see this, let � (�
�
, R ),[(u(cJ )!u(cL )]/�![cJ !R cL ].�
� �� � �� �� � �� �� � ��
� The concavity of u( ) ) implies that � (�
�
, R ) is positive. This fact is also true for its analogs. 
� �� �
�� � 
��
� � 
�
 [� �
�� � �
 
�
 [�

��
 ��
 
�

# � � 
� � 
�

�� �
 
� �
 
�
 [�

�� �
 �� ��
 ��

�
 [�

�� � ��
 ��
 
� 
�
 
� � 
�� � 
The ﬁrst rule is
 
1  if  � (�
�
, R )'� (1),
� 
� �� � �
j (�
�
, R )" ���(� (�
�
, R )) if � (�
�
, R )3[� (0), � (1)],
�� �� � � � �� � � �� � � �
0 otherwise. 
Now let � (� �
�
, R ),[(u(cJ )!u(cL )]/� �![cJ !R cL ]. Then the
� � �� � �� �� � � �� �� � ��
rule for purchasing foreign goods is 
1  if  � (� �
�
, R )'� (1),
� 
� � �� � �
j (� �
�
, R )" ���(� (�
�
,�
�
, R )) if � (� �
�
, R )3[� (0), � (1)],
�� � �� � � � �� � � � �� � � �
0 otherwise. 
The Appendix shows that a depreciation of the real exchange rate reduces the 
measure of imports bought on credit. A real depreciation raises the ﬁxed cost of 
trade credit and thus reduces imports of these services. Since � /� is the shadow 
value of foreign exchange, a depreciation likewise lowers the opportunity cost of 
foreign money and increases the share of imports bought with foreign exchange. 
The rules for the foreign country are analogous, but a real depreciation causes 
foreigners to purchase a wider array of domestic exports on credit. Thus a real 
depreciation curtails foreign credit and expands the share of domestic resources 
used by local ﬁnancial intermediaries. 
It is convenient to deﬁne CI 
��
,��� (i)c (i)di, �
��
,��� (i)� (i)di, and
� �� �� � �� �
CK 
��
,��[1!� (i)]c (i)di. These are the domestic economy’s aggregate con­
� �� ��
sumption of home credit goods, domestic credit services, and domestic cash 
goods. The aggregates CI 
��
, � , and CK are the analogous imports. Further, 
CI * K * I * , are the analogs for the foreign country. The Appendix 
��
, �* 
��
, C
��
, C
��
, �* 
�� �� 
shows that 
CK
�� �� �
CK #� (CI #� )]#e
�� ��
p
�� �� ��
p

� � � �
 
where k ,p Ak /R . Likewise the foreign country’s choices satisfy 
� �� � ��

#� (CI #� )]4k
��
p
�� �� ��
H

CK * #� (CI * #�* )]#e
��
p
�� �� � 
CK
 *
pp

� � � � 
#� (CI * #�* )]4k*#e
��
p
�� �� �� � � 
� H* 
where now k*,e p k /R . These constraints discount credit goods by one 
� � �� � ��
extra period, showing precisely how cash goods are more expensive than credit 
�� �� 
�� 
�� 
� � ��
goods. They also demonstrate that each country’s wealth depends upon its 
money supply process and the initial nominal exchange rate. This exchange rate 
determines a country’s well-being since it aﬀects both countries’ monetary 
policies and the pattern of trade. 
Since the real exchange rate is constant, it will have an eﬀect on a country’s 
long-run growth only if it inﬂuences the asymptotic share of national income 
spent on foreign credit. Thus the long-run eﬀect of exchange rates will depend 
upon the nature of lim � /k , and little can be said about this term unless 
� � �� � �
explicit assumptions about the costs of trade credit are made. 
The real exchange rate, however, can have an important eﬀect during the 
early stage of development. The terms CI and CK do not depend upon the 
��
, �
�� ��
real exchange rate, but CI and CK all do. If � is suﬃciently high, then 
��
, �
�� �� � 
� "CI "0 for ﬁnitely many t. Also, a country’s demand for foreign cash 
goods depends negatively upon the real exchange rate and the foreign nominal 
interest rate. 
There is an intermediate stage during which the domestic economy becomes 
integrated into the world ﬁnancial system. At this point, both �
and CI become positive. If foreign nominal interest rates are strictly positive, 
then the domestic economy will replace a smaller volume of transactions 
in imported cash goods with a larger volume of foreign credit goods. 
Thus, during this intermediate stage, growth drops and the external surplus 
decreases. 
4. A parametric example 
Of course, the exact description of the credit technologies will largely deter­
mine the properties of the equilibrium of the world economy. I assume that 
�
�
(i)"tan(�i/2) and �
�
(i)"F#tan(�i/2), where F'0 is the ﬁxed cost of 
ﬁnding foreign credit in a neighborhood of the foreign ﬁnancial center. I also 
impose symmetric credit costs: �
�
*(i)"�
�
(i) and �
�
*(i)"�
�
(i). This symmetry 
shows that neither country has a comparative advantage in verifying interna­
tional creditworthiness. Also, these functions have easy inverses, and 
�
��
,����� (i)di"!ln(cos(� j /2)). 
Let u( ) )"u*( ) )"ln( ) ) so that the asymptotic growth properties are simple 
to describe. It follows that cJ "1/�
�
, cL "1/�R , cJ "1/� �
�
, and
�� �� � �� � �� �
cL "1/� � R The relevant values for the foreign country are:
�� � � �� �
. 
cJ * "1/�
� 
*, cL * "1/�*R , cJ * "� /�*, and cL * "� /�R Also, the evolu­
�� �� � �� � �� � � �� � � �� �
. 
tion of the margins between credit and cash goods follows: 
j "max�0, (2/�)arctan(ln(R )/� )�,
�� �� � �
j "max�0, (2/�)arctan(!F#ln(R )/� � )�.
�� �� � � �
Likewise, 
j* "max�0, (2/�)arctan(ln(R )/�*)�,
�� �� � � 
j* "max�0, (2/�)arctan(!F#� ln(R )/�*)�.
�� � �� � � 
Now consider an equilibrium in which both domestic and foreign nominal 
interest rates are eventually constant. Then Eq. (5) and the form of the felicity 
function imply that the long-run growth rate is A� if the share of resources used 
for credit is asymptotically zero. The Appendix shows this is true. Still, the 
economy’s use of resources for ﬁnancial intermediation is not bounded, al­
though the share of that sector shrinks as the economy grows. In a more general 
class of equilibria in which strictly positive interest rates display cycles, the cash­
in-advance constraints would always bind. The long-run growth rates would 
still approach A�, although there might be credit cycles depending upon how 
interest rates aﬀected aggregate demand. 
There is no analytical description of the equilibrium, even under the simple 
assumption that interest rates are constant. The rest of this section describes 
simulations of equilibria using parameters given in Table 1. 
Real interest rates are 3%, and the long-run growth rate of the world 
economy satisﬁes A�"1.0197, chosen to match Ireland’s (1994) simulations 
based upon King and Rebelo (1990). The initial capital stocks play two roles. 
First, each country is large, and monetary policy will have both domestic and 
international eﬀects. Second, the absolute size of an economy determines the 
initial share of the ﬁnancial sector. For example, if the economy purchases 28% 
of its goods with credit, then about 10% of GDP is spent on ﬁnancial intermedi­
aries.� Also, since F"1, an economy that purchases 5% of foreign goods on 
credit uses almost 5% of GDP just paying for the services of foreign ﬁnanciers. 
Notice ﬁrst that social welfare is maximized if each government follows 
a Friedman rule: set the nominal interest rate at zero and allow each economy to 
deﬂate at 1/A so that money is not denominated in rate of return.� In an 
international economy, this is not quite a complete speciﬁcation of equilibrium 
because a planner still can choose how to split consumption between countries 
in each period. In essence, diﬀerent initial nominal exchange rates serve this 
purpose, and Fig. 1 gives the utility frontier for the world economy.�� The 
frontier is linear because the utility functions allow simple aggregation across 
� In the national income and product accounts of the United States, the rubric ﬁnance, insurance, 
and real estate has contributed about 10% of value added in the last two decades. 
� Also, the world economy is immediately on its asymptotic growth path. 
�� Imposing the transversality conditions for both capital stocks, I used a shooting algorithm for 
these and all subsequent simulations. In essence, this algorithm searches for values for � and �* and 
then checks if each country’s gross growth rate is A�$0.000001 after 1000 yr. � � 
� � 
Table 1 
The model parameters 
A � k k* F 
1.03 0.99 1 1 1 
Fig. 1. Pareto frontier. 
countries, and we see that a weak exchange rate corresponds to a low level of 
domestic utility. The natural focal point is of course when e "1 and domestic 
and foreign utilities are both !668. � 
Unfortunately, countries do not follow Friedman rules. Thus I calibrate 
a base case that simulates the actual world economy more closely. In particular, 
I set the domestic nominal interest rate at 4% per annum and the foreign 
nominal interest rate at 8%; the Fisher relations imply that domestic inﬂation is 
1% and foreign inﬂation is 5%. Figs. 2 and 3 are then drawn for e
� 
"1. 
Fig. 2 shows clearly the three phases that characterize an economy’s growth 
path. First, a country uses foreign exchange to buy foreign goods; thus its export 
earnings constrain its imports. Second, there is an intermediate period of rapidly 
expanding use of trade credit, when the growth rate drops as real resources are 
used to become integrated into the world ﬁnancial system. Third, a country 
grows asymptotically at the rate reﬂecting the eﬀects of the discount factor and 
Fig. 2. Base case growth rates. 
Fig. 3. External balance/GDP. 
the marginal eﬃciency of investment. In the long run, almost all goods are 
purchased with credit, although there are always small sectors in both countries 
that use currencies as means of payment. Notice that the high rate of foreign 
inﬂation spurs the domestic economy to a higher peak growth rate. These 
moderately positive nominal interest rates entail a slight loss of utility for each 
country, but the welfare loss for the foreign country is less than 0.1% and it is 
even lower for the home country. Thus low inﬂation rates put both economies 
only slightly inside the Pareto frontier. 
Fig. 3 shows the domestic economy’s external balance as a percentage 
of its gross domestic product. This balance includes the trade surplus and the 
surplus on ﬁnancial services. The home country runs initial surpluses because 
foreigners take advantage of low domestic interest rates to buy a large volume of 
domestic cash goods. Also, the domestic economy’s share of world wealth is less 
than its share of world population since its rate of monetary expansion is 
relatively low. It runs an initial external surplus that is eventually exhausted 
once the home country becomes fully integrated into the international ﬁnancial 
system. 
Fig. 4 relates exchange rates and growth paths; the domestic and foreign 
inﬂation and interest rates are the same as the base case but the initial nominal 
(and real) exchange rate varies. Since the long-run share of resources used in 
trade credit does not depend upon the real exchange rate, it can only have 
a transitory growth eﬀect. A stronger exchange rate is not associated with higher 
peak growth rates; instead it is related to the speed of integration of the home 
country into the world ﬁnancial system. Thus a real appreciation is correlated 
with increased growth rates during the early phase of an economy’s growth 
trajectory. Also, a stronger exchange rate is linked with lower external balances 
and higher domestic welfare. 
Fig. 4. Exchange rates and growth rates. 
Figs. 5 and 6 show the domestic and international Tobin eﬀects. In Fig. 5, 
foreign interest rates and the exchange rate are as in the base case, but the 
domestic interest rate is allowed to vary. Low rates occur when the domestic 
economy sets the nominal interest rate at zero, and the high rates correspond to 
Fig. 5. Domestic growth rates and domestic interest rates. 
Fig. 6. Domestic growth rates and foreign interest rates. 
a nominal interest rate of 103% and thus inﬂation is near 100% per annum. This 
diagram simply underscores that Ireland’s ﬁndings are robust in a two-country 
world: higher domestic inﬂation spurs growth in the short run. Fig. 6 is 
analogous, but now the home interest rate and exchange rate are as in the 
base case, and foreign interest rates are allowed to be 0%, 8%, or 103%. 
This diagram shows that a country exports its Tobin eﬀect since higher 
foreign inﬂation spurs domestic growth as consumers switch from imported 
cash goods to investment, the quintessential domestic credit good. Notice also 
that higher foreign rates increase the speed at which the domestic economy 
becomes integrated into the world ﬁnancial system. Thus the eﬀects of foreign 
inﬂation are twofold: they raise domestic growth and peak growth rates occur 
earlier. 
Fig. 7 is the ﬁrst example in the literature of an anticipated Tobin eﬀect. In this 
case, the exchange rate and domestic and foreign interest rates are the same as in 
the base case for 100 yr. Then domestic interest rates increase from 4% to 6% 
per annum. Uncovered interest parity implies an anticipated discrete deprecia­
tion of the nominal exchange rate in period 101. Anticipated inﬂation reduces 
growth at home and abroad until higher domestic inﬂation occurs. Then there is 
a discrete jump in growth when the policy is implemented. For this parameteriz­
ation of the model, there is a short-run trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and economic 
activity, although higher growth actually means lower welfare at home 
and abroad. Further, the anticipated depreciation actually lowers the external 
Fig. 7. Anticipated rise in inﬂation. 
surplus, since higher rates of domestic money creation raise the initial share of 
world wealth accruing to the home country. 
5. Conclusion 
In an important sense, this model largely conﬁrms Sidrauski’s (1967) seminal 
work. For plausible speciﬁcations of the credit technologies, inﬂation only has 
transitory growth eﬀects. But the simulations conducted in Section 4 certainly 
suggest that inﬂation can have eﬀects that last well beyond the planning horizon 
of a government in a modern industrial economy. The growth eﬀects of moder­
ate rates of inﬂation are not large, but high inﬂation can raise growth signiﬁ­
cantly, at least for several decades. 
Exchange rates are associated with two eﬀects in this model. First, a strong 
exchange rate is linked with how quickly an economy becomes integrated into 
the world ﬁnancial system. Thus a low inﬂation country with a strong exchange 
rate has an initial growth spurt and then a decline in growth as it makes the 
transition from using foreign exchange to foreign ﬁnancial intermediaries to pay 
for imports. Second, a real appreciation rate is associated with a larger external 
deﬁcit. In the simulations presented in Section 4, a real appreciation of 100% is 
equivalent to a gain of about 10% of national output when both countries 
conduct monetary policies that maximize social welfare. 
It is worth emphasizing that there is no prisoner’s dilemma for monetary 
policy here. Each country ﬁnds it in its own self-interest to set its nominal 
interest rate at zero, and a regime of ﬁxed exchange rates emerges naturally in 
this framework. Of course, the key issue is: what ﬁxed exchange would the two 
central banks support? The natural focal point is related to the two countries 
relative shares in world wealth, but in the end, there is no strong philosophical 
argument for any particular exchange rate, especially when the gains from trade 
are high.�� Thus describing the details of a monetary union perhaps falls more in 
the realm of political science than of economics. 
This paper is only the ﬁrst step in what may become a larger literature. There 
have been so few applied theoretical analyses of exchange rates and economic 
growth because there is a genuine paucity of satisfying models in which money 
plays an explicit role. This paper has imposed a cash-in-advance constraint, but 
there are other approaches with their own strengths and weaknesses. Diﬀerent 
perspectives on monetary phenomena in growing economies will shed further 
light on the relationship between exchange rates and growth. Still, the link 
between trade credit and growth seems important, and measuring the strength 
of this relationship is a ripe area for empirical research. 
�� This is implicit in the arguments in Fisher (1996), where countries are modeled as sequences of 
agents. 
�� �� � � �
�� �� ��
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Appendix 
Claim A.1. If foreign interest rates are strictly positive, then a depreciation of the 
real exchange rate reduces the measure of foreign goods bought on credit. 
Proof. Total diﬀerentiation of the equality 
u(cJ )!� � (cJ #� (i))"u(cL )!(� �#� )cL
�� � � �� � �� � � �� �� 
yields 
u�(cJ )�cJ /��!�
�
cJ !� � (i)!� � �cJ /��!� � �� (i)�i/��
�� �� � �� � � � � �� � � � � � 
"u�(cL )�cL /��!�
�
cL !(� �#� )�cL /��
�
.
�� �� � �� � � �� ��
But u�(cJ )"� � and u�(cL )"� �#� Thus � �� (i)�i/��"cL !cJ !� (i).
�� � � �� � � ��
. 
� � � �� �� �
Since cL (cJ � (i)'0, and �� (i)'0, we may conclude that �i/��" 
�� ��
, 
� � �
[cL !cJ !� (i)]/� �� (i). This completes the proof. 
Claim A.2. ¹here are simple expressions for the countries’ budget constraints. 
Proof. Using the notation in the text, we can deﬁne domestic and foreign 
money-to-hold and see that m !p CK 50 and m
��
,M
�� �� �� ��
, 
M !p CK 50. Then Eq. (1) implies: 
p CK #m #B /R #e p CK #e m #e B /R 4H .
�� �� �� �� �� � �� �� � �� � �� �� �
Also, the budget constraint for t"1 implies: 
p k #p (CI #� )#M #B /R #e p (CI #� )
�� � �� �� �� �� �� �� � �� �� ��
#e B /R #e M 4p Ak #B #m #e m #e B #H
�
.
� �� �� � �� �� � �� �� � �� � ��
Divide this expression by R , add it to the previous one, and use 
e /e "R /R to derive: ��
� � �� �� 
p CK #e p CK #p (CI #� )/R #e p (CI #� )/R
�� �� � �� �� �� �� �� �� � �� �� �� �� 
#m (R !1)/R #e m (R !1)/R #M /R
�� �� �� � �� �� �� �� �� 
� 
�
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 � 
#B /R R #e B /R R #e M /R #p k /R
�� �� �� � �� �� �� � �� �� �� � �� 
4p Ak /R #H #H /R .
�� � �� � � ��
But m (R !1)/R "e m (R !1)/R "0 because the interest rate is 
�� �� �� � �� �� ��
strictly positive if and only if the relevant cash-in-advance constraint binds. 
Thus we may write 
p CK #e p CK #p (CI #� )/R #e p (CI #� )/R
�� �� � �� �� �� �� �� �� � �� �� �� �� 
#M /R #B /R R #e B /R R #e M /R
�� �� �� �� �� � �� �� �� � �� �� 
#p k /R 4k #H #H /R
�� � �� �� � � �� 
where k ,p Ak /R . Repeating these two steps of algebra for t51, we 
�� �� � ��
derive 
[� p CK #� (CI #� )]#� M #� B
���� �� �� ��
p
�� �� �� �� �� � �� � �� � 
#� k #e [� p CK #� (CK #�
���� �� �� ��
p
�� �� ��
)]

��
p

where the discount factors are as in the text. The ﬁrst-order conditions imply 
that R "Ap , and I have used this relation to eliminate the terms 
��
p
�� �� �
p k and p Ak /R . Now the asymptotic constraints on the domestic 
�� �� � �� � � � ��
and foreign bond markets imply that lim � B "lim � B "0.
� � �� � �� � � � �� � �� �
Also, the transversality conditions imply lim � M "lim � M " 
� � �� �� � � � �� �� �
lim � k "0. Thus 
� � ��
p
�� �� �
 
C CK
���� �� � 
#e � M #e � B 4k
�� � �� � �� �
H

K #� (CI #� )]#e
��
p
�� �� ��
p
 p

��� ���
 
where I have imposed that the present value of the monetary transfers be well 
deﬁned. The analogous condition holds for the foreign country. This completes 
the proof. 
Claim A.3. For the example in Section 4, the asymptotic share of resources used in 
ﬁnancial intermediation is zero. 
#� (CI #� )]4k
��
p
�� ��
H

�� � �
� �
Proof. Working in continuous time and using L’Hoö pital’s rule, I will show that 
lim � /Ak"0. Since � j /2"arctan(ln R /� ), it is natural to deﬁne 
� � �� � �� �� � �
�(t)"!ln(cos �(t))
 
Ak e�� 
,
 
where �(t)"arctan(ln R /� ) and g"A�. Then the continuous time analog 
�� � �
of ﬁrst-order conditions implies R /�"R e��/� for a ﬁxed path of interest 
�� � � �� �
rates. Now 
(tan �(t))��(t) (ln R )e����(t)
lim �(t)"lim "lim ��
� � � � Ak ge�� � � � Ak ge�� 
(ln R )��(t)"lim ��
� � � Ak g 
where I have used that the derivative of !ln(cos �) is tan �. The derivative of 
arctan(x) is 1/(1#x�). Hence, 
(ln R )��(t) (ln R )ge��/�
lim �� "lim �� � 
� � � Ak g � �� Ak g�1#[(ln R )e��/� ]��
� � � � �� �
ln R"lim �� "0.
� �Ak
�
(�
�
�e���#(ln R
��
)�e��) 
The analog for foreign ﬁnancial intermediation is immediate since the real 
exchange rate is constant. This completes the proof. 
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